This paper reviews the recent literature that quantitatively assesses the effect on international trade of membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In my 2004a paper, I show that a straightforward look at the data does not find a strong effect of GATT/WTO membership on bilateral trade. I present and analyze three serious criticisms of this work: 1) inappropriate pooling of data across countries, sectors, and time; 2) inappropriate econometric techniques, especially regarding fixed effects; and 3) selection bias, since membership in the GATT/WTO may encourage pairs of countries to trade when they otherwise would not. I also present my critics with a couple of challenges, including finding a substantive effect of membership on multilateral trade and measures of trade policy.
Introduction
In 2002 I began to work on the effects of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
1 I was interested in quantifying the effects of membership in these multilateral trade organizations on international trade. I fully expected to find a large positive effect, and was primarily interested in comparing this to the effects of other things that enhanced trade (particularly the effects of currency unions).
However, I was astonished to find that a naïve look at the data yielded little evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO had an effect on trade that was either economically or statistically substantive. In this paper, I review the state of the small literature that developed around this issue, as of April 2006.
What I Did
My initial (2004a) entrée used bilateral data to estimate the effect of membership in the GATT/WTO on trade. Since this paper has generated the most heat, it's worth explaining my methodology a little. I used a standard "gravity" model of bilateral trade augmented with additional controls: ln(T ijt ) = β D lnD ij + β Y ln(Y i Y j ) t + β X X ijt + γ 1 Bothin ijt + γ 2 Onein ijt + ε ijt (1) where: the regressand (T) is (real) trade between countries i and j at year t, D denotes great-circle distance between the countries, Y denotes real GDP, X denotes a vector of other controls (population, dummies for common language, money, and border, geographic characteristics, colonial characteristics, time dummies, and so forth), {β} denotes a set of nuisance coefficients, and ε is a (hopefully well-behaved) residual. The coefficients of interest to me were γ 1 (especially) and γ 2 , which measure the effects on trade of GATT/WTO membership by both countries and one country respectively, ceteris paribus.
I estimated {γ} in my benchmark regressions with OLS using a large panel of data covering over 50 years of data and 175 countries. To my surprise, I found that both coefficients were economically small and statistically insignificant (estimates are tabulated below). I also convinced myself that the results seemed to be insensitive to the exact econometric assumptions I made; more on that below. In passing, I also used multilateral data and event studies to verify the same points; more on that too, later.
For a while I didn't understand this negative result or think it plausible; it struck me as odd that membership in as apparently important an institution as the World Trade Organization could have a negligible impact on trade. But thanks to a moment of inspiration provided by my son, I realized that if GATT/WTO membership had little effect on trade policy, it might also have little effect on trade flows. 2 Accordingly, I checked out this explanation in Rose (2004b) .
In that paper, I used almost 70 measures of trade policy and liberalization -all that I could findto see if membership in the GATT/WTO was actually associated with more liberal trade policy.
With one exception -the Heritage Foundation's index of economic freedom -the answer was a resounding no; members of the GATT/WTO just didn't seem to have measurably more liberal trade policy than outsiders. This was consistent with my initial results on actual trade flows; it also seems to jive with the notions of many colleagues, as I discovered in subsequent presentations.
I also wrote two more narrowly focused follow-ups on the topic. Since some think that a big part of membership in the GATT/WTO is on the stability and predictability of trade policy, in Rose (2005a) , I examined the second moment of trade flows, not their first moment. Again, I
found little evidence of any large membership effect. In Rose (2005b) there's lots of dispute, and more remains to be done: as Evenett (2005, p1) writes: "we know much less about the effects of WTO accession than we probably should… Generally, little is known about the effects of WTO accession on developing countries… The scholarly community is not alone in its lack of attention to WTO accession matters…" But at least we've started.
And a propos, I want to thank my critics. To have a critique published on your paper is a high honor. Only those who care, actually take the pains to work on a dispute.
Reasons I Might Be Right
In the remainder of the paper, I will respond to my critics, organizing my thoughts by theme rather than paper. 3 But before I go into defensive mode, let me lay out a few reasons why you might conceivably think I'm right, namely that membership in the GATT/WTO doesn't deliver more trade. These facts are mostly conventional wisdom that lie beyond the narrow confines of econometric estimates. Table 1 . A number of these are negative; none is significantly positive. The primary objective of a number of these projects was not the relevance of the GATT/WTO. For instance, Felbermayr and Kohler (2005) are primarily interested in resolving the "distance puzzle" of an elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance that seems to be increasing over time. 5 Leeson (2005) is primarily interested in the importance of the New York Convention for trade. I
conclude that plain vanilla estimation of the effect of GATT/WTO membership on bilateral trade does not deliver a large positive effect; one has to look more subtly for that result.
Reasons I Might Be Wrong
There are three key criticisms of my work: inappropriate data pooling; inappropriate handling of fixed effects; and selection bias. Below, I summarize the arguments and respond.
Then I present a few challenges to my opponents. 6. The first five facts imply that the impact of membership should be higher in developed countries
They also summarize the work of others, especially Subramanian and Wei (2006) , Tomz et al (2005) , and the work of authors concerned with zero-trade observations. See also Evenett and
Gage (2005), and Evenett, Gage, and Kennett (2004) . I've collected some key estimates of the effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade in a table presented in the appendix.
Criticism #1: Excessive Pooling
A number of my critics have argued that looking at all trade simultaneously masks the effects of the GATT/WTO. The fine work of Subramanian and Wei (2006) is especially forceful on this point. Their argument is that if you disentangle by country/time/sector etc, you can find significant trade effects of membership for subsets of the data. 6 Subramanian and Wei show convincingly that different pieces of the data can certainly deliver significant and plausible effects of membership on trade.
This is certainly a serious critique, but I'm not sure it is a wholly legitimate argument.
What do we learn when we study the trade patterns of countries and sectors that have liberalized, and ignore those that haven't? Subramanian and Wei claim that the GATT/WTO has been successful, since there has been liberalization by some countries in some sectors over some periods of time. Why can't one declare just as well failure since most countries have not liberalized most of their trade by now? To put it a different way the GATT has worked well, if you ignore the countries, sectors, and times when it hasn't. We're all agreed that if you ignore its failures, the GATT/WTO has been successful. But that's hardly a ringing endorsement of the institution.
Pooling across Countries
There are two critiques of relevance here, both associated with handling developing countries. The view of many, most notably Subramanian and Wei (2006) , is that the GATT was essentially a club for developed countries. 7 Subramanian and Wei argue that by including developing countries that are GATT members technically but not in spirit, I've rigged the analysis to make the GATT look irrelevant. Combining data on developing and developed countries masks the impact of the GATT on the latter. Their powerful conclusion is that the GATT/WTO has more than doubled global trade, much more than a statistical nicety.
On the other hand, Tomz et al. (2005) argue that some developing countries informally participated in the GATT and seemed to trade more than outsiders. Their statistical analysis relies on a carefully constructed data set that includes not only formal members of the GATT, but also a number of other categories for countries that participated in other capacities. Their argument is that I ignored these informal GATT participants, and thus under-estimated its impact. So while Subramanian and Wei criticize me for including any developing countries at all, Tomz et al say the opposite, which strikes me as odd, at least prima facie. Their view is that the relevance of the GATT can be rescued only by including developing countries, in particular those that aren't formally members but are in spirit. Both critiques are well-crafted and serious, but it's hard to see how they can both be right simultaneously. "Why are developing countries so interested in FTAs? In the past, these countries were able to obtain improved access to industrial markets through GATT negotiations that did not require them to reciprocate by opening their own markets to foreign competition. While useful, prior GATT rounds had two major shortcomings: they did not prompt policy changes in developing countries that would induce adequate flows of investment and transfers of technology (apart from extractive industries), and competitive agricultural and manufactured exports of developing countries often were excluded from the reforms. In short, developing countries were free riders on the GATT system until the Uruguay Round, but derived only modest benefits from their own minimal contributions to GATT negotiations. They protected their own markets, but in turn had to accept the maintenance of high foreign trade barriers against their most competitive exports."
Alternatively, Krueger writes in the introduction to The WTO as an International Organization (p7):
"Developing countries' attitudes and trade policies during the 1950s and 1960s generally resulted in heightened walls of protection as industrialization through "import substitution" was attempted. That generally meant that developing countries were not benefiting as much as they might have from the growth of the world economy, while the "balance-of-payments" provisions of the GATT were liberally interpreted to enable developing countries to maintain quantitative restrictions, often including import prohibitions, on their imports. Moreover, the GATT articles were amended in the early 1960s to provide non-reciprocal preferential treatment of imports from those countries. One consequence was that developing countries (the East Asian newly industrializing countries being a prominent exception) were losing shares of their world markets."
It's worth stressing that developing countries really are key to Tomz et al. The second row of their Table 4 indicates that GATT participation has a statistically weak (though positive) effect on trade when you look only at industrial countries. The effect is significant only when you include developing countries.
Another uncomfortable feature of the results of Tomz et al, is that informal participation in the GATT consistently matters more for trade than formal membership. This doesn't seem wholly plausible to me (at least not without some explanation), and is a cause for concern. I simply don't understand why informal participation could create more trade than actual membership in the GATT. This is especially true in light of the recent work by Tang and Wei (2006) who show that more rigorous entry requirements for WTO membership are associated with better results.
So I don't really buy the argument of Tomz et al that re-classifying certain developing countries as informal GATT participants can rescue the importance of the institution. That said, it seems inappropriate to ignore developing countries. There seems to be little doubt that the GATT made little impact on the trade policy of many developing countries. Personally, I think this cannot be counted as an indicator of the institution's success, so I guess I really just disagree with the interpretation of Subramanian and Wei (2006) .
Time and Industries
Just as Subramanian and Wei (2006) argue that I inappropriately bundle together developing and developed countries, they also argue that aggregating across sectors of economy can disguise the true effectiveness of the GATT/WTO. In particular, they argue that key sectors (critically agriculture, but also textiles, clothing and footwear) have not been included in the GATT's liberalization efforts, so that including these industries in the analysis gives a false impression that the institution has been ineffective. Again, my interpretation is different. Agricultural produce is highly tradable, and has historically been the battleground for commercial policy. The beginning of the modern era of commercial policy is commonly considered to be the repeal of the British "Corn Laws" while the failure to liberalize agriculture remains a key reason why the Doha round has thus far met with limited success. If the GATT/WTO has been such a successful liberalizer, it does not seem kosher simply to ignore its failures in agriculture. 10 On aggregation over time, I have little to say. I hope that the WTO (established to succeed the GATT in 1995) has been and will be a more effective liberalizer than the GATT.
Still, I haven't been able to see it myself in the data myself.
11 Is China the new norm (and if it sticks to the spirit of its accession deal), or the exception? I think we need more time and more post-GATT accessions to resolve this issue. The preliminary evidence, as summarized in e.g., and Drabek and Bacchetta (2004) exists, but seems rather weak. Tang and Wei (2006) have found positive results of recent WTO entry on growth and investment, though they do not look directly at trade. 17 Currently, it's unclear to me just how important this issue is in practice.
Criticism #2: Fixed Effects and Variation across Countries and Time
There are at least a couple of other issues in the area. Some of the gravity effects estimated with the newer models seem like they've changed a lot, at least to me. It would also be interesting to see the effects of Tomz et al's informal participation combined with the careful selection bias techniques that have been developed.
Still, the GATT/WTO may well have played an important role in fostering the development of trade linkages that might not have existed in its absence. I expect further work on this issue in the future, but consider it to be a serious criticism of my initial analysis.
Challenge #1: Beyond Bilateral Trade Flows
Many of my critics argue that the GATT/WTO has liberalized trade flows, if one looks carefully at bilateral data. Are these results apparent in multilateral data? My finding of a noneffect of GATT/WTO membership on trade seems to be apparent in the data, at least to me. In To make this all a little more concrete, in Table 2 Table 3 shows the weak linkages between measures of trade policy and membership in the GATT/WTO. This is simply taken from my 2004b paper; interested readers can refer to that paper for further details. I also present in Figure 2 some analogous event studies, again taken from my 2004b paper. There is little evidence that GATT/WTO entry has a strong significant effect on trade policy.
My second challenge is: where's the convincing evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO has affected trade policy?
Challenge #3: What does the WTO Do?
Until recently there has been something of a problem of understanding the basic rationale for the GATT/WTO. After all, the most primitive argument for trade liberalization is unilateral;
why does one need a multilateral institution at all? 20 In an influential series of articles summarized in a monograph, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) have now provided an answer: negotiation through the GATT/WTO solves a terms of trade externality. Otherwise liberalizing countries might worry that unilateral elimination of protection might hurt their terms of trade.
This is a fine theoretical argument, and I admire and applaud the excellent work of Bagwell and Staiger. But is it of obvious empirical relevance? Thus far it has not been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. Doing so is far beyond the scope of this paper, but let me provide a little evidence of relevance. In particular, I present in Figure 3 a set of plots that look at the World Bank's "barter terms of trade" (indexed so that they're all equal to 100 in the year 2000) during the three years before and after the completion of the Uruguay round. I do this on a country-by country basis, for twelve big economies, twelve OECD and four developing. Now these graphics are rough. They're aggregate in that they cover the whole economy. Felbermayr and Kohler (2005) .09 (.08) Table 2 , intensive margin Leeson (2005) .12 (.06) Table 2 , default .04 (.03) Regressand: log of openness (i.e., ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in percent) unless noted. Data from PWT6; 158 countries, 1950-1998; 5499 observations unless noted. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * "Extra Controls" are: a) currency union dummy; b) dependency dummy; c) log of area; d) island dummy; and e) landlocked dummy. Extra controls reduce observations to 4803. 
